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JUSTICE SCALIA AND TONTO  






In the last generation, the Supreme Court has changed the way 
that it interprets statutes that regulate Indian affairs.1 The Court has 
moved away from using legislative history and the Indian law 
canons of construction to aid in its interpretation of Indian law 
statutes, to relying on textualism and plain meaning. Throughout 
the twentieth century, the Court used the Indian law canons of 
construction found in Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United 
States2 and legislative history to analyze Indian law statutes. The 
Court used these tools of statutory interpretation to reach decisions 
in Indian law cases concerning a variety of issues ranging from 
tribal sovereignty, hunting and fishing rights, to tribal freedom 
from taxation by the state and local governments. The Court’s use 
of the Indian law canons of construction along with legislative 
history allowed it to craft opinions that were in harmony with the 
trust relationship that exists between the United States and Indian 
tribes. 
In cases that involve interpreting statutes that regulate Indian 
affairs, the Court has now opted to ignore the Indian law canons of 
construction and legislative history. Instead the Court halts its 
statutory interpretation in Indian law cases at the plain text 
                                                                                                             
* The author is a rising third year law student at Columbia Law School, and a 
citizen of the Tolowa Deeni Nation of California. 
1 The title of this note reflects the ongoing battle in Indian law between 
textualism and the Indian canons of construction and legislative history that 
occurs when the Supreme Court must engage in statutory interpretation in an 
Indian law case. The title of the note also owes an assist to the incomparable 
Sherman Alexie, and his book The Lone Ranger and Tonto Fistfight in Heaven. 
The author would like to thank Professor and note adviser Steven P. McSloy for 
his help and patience. A huge thank you to the following people who helped 
with this note: the staff at the American Indian Law Journal, Kelsey Leonard, 
Joseph Webster, Lael Echo-Hawk, Judy Gallardo, Curtis Berkey, Dan 
Lewerenz, and David Moran. Last, but not least, a huge thank you to Charlie 
Hobbs for tirelessly advocating for Indian tribes and inspiring so many people, 
the author included, to pursue the study of Indian law.  
2 Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 86 (1918). 
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contained in the statutes. This use of textualism ignores the vital 
purpose that the Indian law canons of construction and legislative 
history play in statutory interpretation in Indian law; that of 
providing context and full meaning to the words in the statute, and 
the intent(s) of Congress in passing the legislation, while also 
paying respect to the sacred trust relationship that exists between 
the United States and tribes.  
This note begins by concentrating on the trust relationship 
between the United States and Indian tribes. In part one the note 
will focus on how the Indian law canons of construction were born 
out of the trust relationship and the relationship between Congress 
and the plenary power that it holds over Indian tribes. The unique 
relationship and power dynamic between Congress and Indian 
tribes will demonstrate the importance of using the Indian law 
canons of construction and legislative history when interpreting 
Indian law statutes.  
Part two will examine three Indian law cases decided before 
1986, when Justice Antonin Scalia replaced Justice William 
Rehnquist who was elevated to Chief Justice upon the death of 
Chief Justice Warren Burger. These three cases used the Indian 
law canons of construction and legislative history to reach a 
positive outcome for tribal interests in cases that involved 
questions of statutory interpretation and an opinion that is in 
harmony with the trust relationship between the United States and 
the Blackfeet Tribe. It is the framework used by the Court to reach 
its decision in Montana v. Blackfeet, as well as the two other cases, 
that should be readopted by the Court in interpreting statutes in 
Indian law cases. 
Part three explores how the use of textualism has allowed the 
Court to render decisions in cases involving statutory interpretation 
in Indian law that have largely ignored the trust relationship, the 
intent of Congress in passing the statute, and the Indian law canons 
of construction. 
Part four examines several Indian law cases from the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts. These latter cases cover a number of areas of 
Indian law, yet they share a common theme: the Court avoided 
using the Indian law canons of construction and legislative history 
in statutory interpretation. Instead, in these cases, the Court opted 
to engage in a selective analysis that places a paramount 
importance on textualism to divine the meaning of the statute. In 




each of these cases, the Court uses textualism to interpret a statute 
in a manner that results in the Court rendering a decision that has a 
negative impact for a tribe or a tribal individual. Further, in each of 
these cases the Court’s use of textualism results in a decision that 
is not in harmony with the trust relationship. By using legislative 
history and the Indian law canons of construction to interpret these 
cases, the Court could have interpreted the statute at issue in each 
case so it that there is no conflict with the trust relationship 
between the United States and Indian tribes. 
 
I. THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP 
 
The Court has long recognized that a trust relationship exists 
between the United States and Indian tribes.3 The trust relationship 
is frequently acknowledged and reaffirmed by Congress as: 
“Nearly every piece of modern legislation dealing with Indian 
tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship 
between tribes and the United States.”4 The trust relationship was 
created through the treaties that the United States entered into with 
Indian tribes during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.5 
From the birth of the Republic until 1871, when Congress 
passed the Indian Appropriations Act of 18716, which prohibited 
future treaty making between Indian nations and the United States, 
the United States entered into hundreds of treaties with various 
tribal nations.7 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
Congress and the President sent emissaries to the various tribes 
that the United States encountered during its westward expansion.8 
                                                                                                             
3 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003). 
4 FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 420-421 (Neil 
J. Newton et al., eds., 2012 ed., 2012). 
5 See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 33 (1942) (“The 
chief foundation [of federal power over Indian affairs] appears to have been the 
treaty-making power of the President and Senate with its corollary of 
Congressional power to implement by legislation the treaties made. And by a 
broad reading of these treaties the national government obtained from the 
Indians themselves authority to legislate from them to carry out the purpose of 
the treaties.”).  
6 See Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Ch. 120, §1, 41 Cong.; 16 Stat. 
544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §71) (“no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of 
the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, 
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”). 
7 COHEN, supra note 6, at 46-66. 
8 COHEN, supra note 6, at 51. 
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These emissaries entered into treaties with tribes that were then 
ratified by the United States Senate.9 In these treaties, the Indian 
tribes ceded land to the United States and, in exchange, the United 
States made promises to Indian tribes to protect them, provide 
them with certain services, and respect the territorial integrity of 
their newly formed reservations in perpetuity.10 These treaties 
created a moral obligation between the United States government  
and Indian tribes. In many treaties the United States promised to 
look after the tribe, protect them, and manage the affairs of the 
tribe.11The Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia analogized the 
trust relationship to that that exists between a ward and their 
guardian.12 The trust relationship be thought of as an affirmation 
that the United States holds a moral obligation to Indian tribes to 
protect their interests.13Out of the trust relationship that was 
established by the signing of treaties between Indian nations and 
the United States the Court would create the Indian law canons of 
construction.  
 
A. The Origins of the Indian Law Canons of Construction 
 
The Indian law canons of construction are two closely related 
rules of treaty and statutory interpretation. The Indian law canon of 
construction that deal with treaties states that ambiguities in 
treaties should be construed in the favor of Indian tribes and that 
treaties should be read as the Indians would have understood 
them.14 The Indian law canon of construction that pertains to 
                                                                                                             
9 See Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, Etc., Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749 
[hereinafter Treaty of Fort Laramie].  
10 See, e.g., Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749; Treaty with the Ottowa, Etc., 
1807, art. 7, Nov. 17, 1807, 7 Stat. 105 (“The said nations of Indians 
acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United States, and no 
other power, and will prove by their conduct that they are worthy of so great a 
blessing.”). 
11See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 117 U.S. 288, 295 
(1886) (“By this treaty the Cherokees were recognized as one people, 
composing one nation, but subject, however, to the jurisdiction and authority of 
the government of the United States, which could regulate their trade and 
manage all their affairs.”). 
12 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 11 (1831) (“Their relations to the 
United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian.”) 
13 Id. (“They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and 
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their 
great father.”).  
14 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832). 




statutory interpretation states that “statutes passed for the benefit of 
dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be liberally 
construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in the favor of the 
Indians.”15 Both of the rules that comprise the Indian law canons of 
construction allow the Court to place the proper weight on the trust 
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes when 
engaging in treaty and statutory interpretation. 
The Indian law canons of construction are born out of the trust 
relationship. When the Court uses the Indian law canons to 
interpret a treaty or statute, they are affirming the trust 
relationship16. The Indian law canons of construction affirm the 
moral obligation between the United States and Indian tribes 
because they recognize the imbalance that exists in the relationship 
between tribes and the United States, thus moving the needle 
towards a more equal relationship. Indian tribes have always been 
at a disadvantage in dealing with the United States within the 
context of the trust relationship.17 During the treaty-making period, 
tribes often times did not understand the terms of the treaties that 
they were entering into because they were written in English, 
which many tribal leaders did not speak.18Treaties are essentially 
contracts between nations.  Using the Indian law canons of 
construction, to interpret an ambiguity in a treaty in favor of Indian 
tribes, is analogous to applying the rule in contract law that 
ambiguities in a contract should be construed in favor of the party 
that did not draft the contract language.19 This rule recognizes the 
position of power that a party holds when drafting a contract. The 
rule that ambiguous terms in a treaty should be construed in the 
favor of the non-drafting Indian tribe recognizes the power 
                                                                                                             
15 Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co., 248 U.S. at 89-90. 
16 See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581 (where the Court created the Indian canon 
of construction); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2 (recognizing the trust 
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes).  
17 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 52 
(1987) (“If Indians are involved, you should infuse all federal laws, old and new, 
with the policy of the special Indian trust relationship and read those laws with a 
heavy bias in favor of Indian and tribal prerogatives.”). 
18 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582 (“How the words of the treaty were understood 
by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule 
of construction.”).  
19 United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970).  
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dynamic that existed between Indian tribes and the United States 
during the treaty-making period.20 
Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice John McLean 
constructed the rule about ambiguities in treaties between the 
United States and Indian tribes should be construed in the favor of 
the Indians.21 In 1832, in Worcester v. State of Georgia, Justice 
McLean22 wrote, “The language used in treaties with the Indians 
should never be construed to their prejudice.”23 The Supreme 
Court cited Justice McLean’s rule of treaty interpretation in 
numerous cases throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
to support their application of the Indian law canons of 
construction.  
In 1866, In re Kansas Indians, the Court held that the State of 
Kansas had no right to tax the lands held by individual members of 
the Shawnee, Miami, and Wea Tribes.24 The sought a narrow 
construction of a provision in the treaty at issue. The particular 
provision exempted the tribal lands from “levy, sale, execution, 
and forfeiture.”25 The State tried to argue that this provision only 
applied to a levy or a sale under judicial proceedings.26 However, 
the Court interpreted the treaty provision in favor of the tribes.27 
In 1886, the Court held in Choctaw Nation v. United States that 
the Choctaw nation was entitled to a judgment against the United 
States for lands that were taken from it and for annuities the United 
States had failed to pay.28 The Nation had sued, alleging that the 
United States had breached the treaty of September 27, 1830, 
                                                                                                             
20 Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1899) (for an explanation of why an 
imbalance in negotiating position matters in interpreting Indian treaties). 
21 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582 (“The language used in treaties with the Indians 
should never be construed to their prejudice. … “How the words of the treaty 
were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, 
should form the rule construction.”).  
22 John McLean (1785-1861) was a United States Representative, Postmaster 
General, and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1829-1861). He was one 
of the two dissenting justices in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
23 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582.  
24 In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 760-61 (1866).  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (“[E]nlarged rules of construction are adopted in reference to Indian 
treaties. In speaking of these rules, Chief Justice Marshall says: ‘The language 
used in treaties with the Indians shall never be construed to their prejudice, if 
words be made us of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning that the 
tenor of their treaty.’”)(quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582).  
28 Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1886).  




between the Choctaw and the United States.29 The United States 
argued that the Choctaw were not entitled to the proceeds from the 
sale of their lands. The Court interpreted the phrase “shall be 
allowed” in the treaty to award the Choctaw the proceeds of the 
sale of the lands which the United States sold that had been ceded 
by the Tribe under the treaty of 1830.30 To support its construction 
of “shall be allowed” in favor of the Choctaw the Court cited 
Worcester.31 
In 1930, in Carpenter v. Shaw, the Court held that the State of 
Oklahoma could not tax the petroleum and natural gas royalties of 
members of the Choctaw nation that stemmed from fossil fuel 
extraction on their allotments.32 The tribal members alleged that 
the State had assessed taxes on their petroleum royalties.33 The 
State argued that the royalties were not exempt because the tribal 
members could alienate their allotted lands. If the lands were able 
to be alienated then they were subject to State taxation.34 To the 
State, the leasing of the petroleum rights by the tribal members was 
an alienation of the tribal member’s allotments that was subject to 
state taxation.35 The Court held that the tribal members were 
exempt from taxation on their petroleum royalties because an 
exemption had been secured by the tribe in its agreement with the 
United States. Even though this exemption did not expressly say 
that the royalties in particular were exempt from State taxation, the 
Court applied the Indian law canons of construction, and construed 
both the Allotment Act and the treaty at issue in favor of the tribe 
and its members.36  
In 1973, in McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 
the Court held that the Arizona state individual income tax was 
unlawful when applied to a Navajo tribal member living on the 
reservation, who derived their income solely from work on the 
reservation.37 In McClanahan, a member of the Navajo Nation 
                                                                                                             
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 33. 
31 Id. at 27-28 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582) (“The language used in 
treaties with the Indians shall never be construed to their prejudice.”). 
32 Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930). 
33 Id. at 365. 
34 Id. at 366. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 366-367.  
37 McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).  
2017] Justice Scalia and Tonto      704 
 
 
who worked solely on the Navajo reservation brought suit when 
$16.20 was held out of her paycheck by the state of Arizona.38 The 
Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the tribal member was not 
exempt from state taxation and was not entitled to a tax refund.39 
The Court cited to Carpenter, in ruling for the tribal member, 
noting that though the 1868 treaty between the United States and 
the Navajo nation did not explicitly state that the Navajo were to 
be free from state taxes, the fact that the lands of the Navajo 
reservation were reserved for the exclusive use and occupancy 
established the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajo under federal 
supervision.40 
It should be noted too that Congress itself, which holds 
“plenary and exclusive powers to legislate in respect to Indian 
Tribes,” essentially followed the language given by Justice 
McLean in Worcester, when it wrote and enacted 25 U.S.C. §194 
in 1834.41 §194 states that, in a dispute over property involving an 
Indian and a non-Indian party, the burden of proof rests with the 
non-Indian party whenever an Indian makes out a presumption of 
title from the fact of a previous possession or ownership.42 §194 
has been cited by the courts in several decisions concerning 
disputes over lands between Indians and non-Indians.43 The 
statute’s most notable recitation by the Court was in Oneida 
County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, finding that the 
tribe could maintain its action for the violation of their possessory 





                                                                                                             
38 Id. at 166.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 174 (quoting Carpenter, 280 U.S. at 367) (“(d)oubtful expressions are to 
be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of 
the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.”).  
41 U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).  
42  25 U.S.C § 194 (2012). 
43 See, e.g., U.S. v. Trujillo, 853 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1988); A&A Concrete, Inc. v. 
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1986); Begay v. Albers, 
721 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1983).  
44 Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 
239 (1985). 




B. Alaska Pacific Fisheries and the Birth of the Statutory 
Canon 
 
From Justice McLean’s rule, the Court then created the Indian 
law canon, that “statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian 
tribes or communities are to be liberally construed, doubtful 
expressions being resolved in the favor of the Indians.”45This 
proposition first appeared in 1918, in the Court’s opinion in Alaska 
Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States. Justice Willis Van Devanter 
wrote the Court’s opinion and used this language to uphold the 
fishing rights of the residents of the Native Alaskan village of 
Metlakatla. The rule pronounced by the Court protected the fishing 
rights of Metlakatla by filling in the gaps in the statute that 
established the reservation on the Annette Islands in modern-day 
Alaska.46 In 1916, the Alaska Pacific Fisheries Company built a 
fish trap near one of the reservation’s islands. The company 
intended to catch approximately six hundred thousand salmon 
every season.47 Congress had failed to explicitly state in the statute 
whether the waters around the islands were part of the reservation. 
The question before the Court was therefore one of construction: 
What was Congress’ intention when it set aside the Annette Islands 
for the Metlakatla Indians?48 Since the islands had little arable 
land, the Court concluded that Congress must have intended to set 
aside the waters surrounding the islands as well as the islands 
themselves; otherwise, the Metlakatla Indians would have been 
unable to sustain themselves.49  
There is no doubt that the statute creating the Metlakatla 
reservation was passed for the village’s benefit. The Court’s Rule, 
derived from Justice McLean’s earlier formulation, that ambiguous 
language in treaties should be construed in the favor of Indians 
allowed him to write a favorable opinion for the Metlakatla 
Indians. The Court was able to make the connection between the 
statute and the treaty canon because the statute was very similar to 
a treaty between the United States and the Metlakatla Indians. The 
                                                                                                             
45 Alaska Pacific Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89-90 (1918). 
46 Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1101 (as 
codified at Comp St. 1916 § 5096a.). 
47 Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co., 248 U.S. at 87. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 87-89 
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statute, similar to prior treaties between the United States and other 
Indian tribes, promised the Metlakatla the Annette Islands and the 
use of the Annette Islands to sustain their community.50 Because of 
the similarities between the statute and the many treaties, which 
the United States had entered into with Indian tribes, the Court was 
able to create the Indian law canon of construction that statutes 
must be construed liberally in favor of Indians.51 A statute that 
regulated Indian affairs, like a treaty, is an exercise of the trust 
relationship that exists between a tribe and Congress.52 Thus, a 
maxim that ambiguities,  in statutes that regulate Indian affairs, 
should be construed in favor of tribes affirms the trust relationship 
by tilting the relationship towards tribal interests because they did 
not write the statutes and are likely to have little to no voice in 
their creation and enactment. 
 
C. Legislative History: The Trust Relationship Necessitates 
the use of Legislative History when Interpreting Statutes that 
Regulate Indian Affairs 
 
Legislative history can assist a judge in cases that deal with 
statutory interpretation. Attorneys and judges can look to the 
legislative history of a statute in order to determine the legislative 
intent behind Congress’ enactment of the statute53. Additionally, 
the Court can consult the legislative history of the statute to clarify 
any ambiguous language in the statute. The materials that make up 
legislative history are the bills, committee hearings, congressional 
debates, and other documents. These materials are compiled while 
                                                                                                             
50 Id. at 86-87 
51 Id. at 86 
52 See Section 15 of the Act of March 3, 1891, C. 561, 26 Stat. 1101 (“That until 
otherwise provided by law the body of lands known as Annette Islands, situated 
in Alexander Archipelago in southeastern Alaska, on the north side of Dixon's 
entrance, be, and the same is hereby, set apart as a reservation for the use of the 
Metlakahtla Indians, and those people known as Metlakahtlans who have 
recently emigrated from British Columbia to Alaska, and such other Alaskan 
Native s as may join them, to be held and used by them in common, under such 
rules and regulations, and subject to such restrictions, as may [be] prescribed 
from time to time by the Secretary of the Interior.”) 
53 KATE M. MANUEL, BRANDON J. MURRILL & ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R 44419, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND 
HIS IMPACT ON THE COURT 6-7 (2016). 




a bill still resides within Congress, and before it is signed into law 
by the President.54 
Legislative history is vitally important to statutory 
interpretation in Indian law because of the trust relationship 
between the United States and Indian tribes, and the authority that 
Congress has over Indian affairs. Every statute that Congress 
enacts, in terms of Indian policy, is Congress exerting its plenary 
power over Indian tribes. 
The Court has long recognized that Congress has plenary 
power over Indian tribes that is nearly omnipotent in nature.55 The 
Court has never held as unconstitutional a statute enacted by 
Congress that regulates Indian affairs.56 Thus, Indian tribes are 
truly at the mercy of any statute that Congress enacts that regulates 
Indian affairs. This unequal relationship shows the importance of 
using legislative history to aid in statutory interpretation in Indian 
law, and the positive effect that the Indian law canons of 
construction can have in ensuring that the trust relationship is 
respected by the Court. The nearly unchecked power that Congress 
holds to regulate Indian affairs calls for the Court to consider the 
legislative history of the statute and the intent of Congress in 
enacting the statute when the statute regulates Indian affairs. The 
nearly supreme position that Congress holds over regulating Indian 
affairs and the nature of the trust relationship calls for the Court to 
use the Indian law canons of construction in interpreting treaties 
and statutes because Congress has a moral obligation to tribes to 
protect their interests. The use of the Indian law canons of 
construction helps to ensure that ambiguous statutes are interpreted 
in the favor of Indian tribes. This is a fulfillment of the trust 
relationship because, on its face, any statute that Congress enacts 
                                                                                                             
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and 
the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1139 n.10 
(1990) (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 
(1989)(“the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide 
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs”); Rice v. 
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719 (1983) (“‘The sovereignty that the Indian Tribes 
retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of 
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.’”) (quoting United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis in Rice)); Federal Power over 
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984)). 
56 Philip Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic 
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1990). 
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that regulates Indian affairs should benefit the Indian tribe 
impacted by the statute, due to the trust responsibility and moral 
obligation that Congress has to look after Indian interests. The use 
of legislative history and respect for congressional intent has 
played a role in several cases where the Court was able to craft an 
opinion that respected the trust relationship between tribes and the 
United States. 
 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN INDIAN LAW AND THE 
COURT BEFORE JUSTICE SCALIA: AN APPROACH ROOTED IN 
HISTORY AND THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP 
 
Before Justice Scalia was appointed to the Court in 1986, the 
Court used legislative history, as well as the Indian law canons of 
construction in a series of cases that limited the power of state 
governments as they sought to intrude into the sphere of tribal 
sovereignty. In particular, three cases show how the Court used the 
Indian law canons of construction and legislative history to craft 
decisions in harmony with congressional intent and the moral 
obligation that the trust relationship imposes upon Congress, to act 
in the best interests of Indian tribes in enacting statutes that 
regulate Indian affairs. 
In 1968, in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, the 
Court held that the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee 
Tribe of Wisconsin were preserved by the Wolf River Treaty of 
1854.57 The Court ruled in favor of the Tribe, even though the 
Tribe’s status as a federally recognized Tribe had been terminated 
by Congress in 195458. In 1976, in Bryan v. Itasca County, the 
petitioner Russell Bryan was an enrolled member of the Minnesota 
Chippewa Tribe. Bryan lived in a mobile home located on trust 
lands on the Leech Lake Reservation in Minnesota.59 Bryan asked 
for a declaratory judgment from the Court, preventing Itasca 
County and the state of Minnesota from taxing him because Itasca 
County, where the reservation is located, had sought to collect 
personal property tax on the mobile home for $147.95.60 The Court 
                                                                                                             
57 Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405-406 (1968). 
58 Id. at 405-406 
59 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 375 (1976). 
60 Id. at 375. 




held for Bryan, ruling against the efforts of the 61State and County 
to tax Bryan. In 1985, the Court decided Montana v. Blackfeet. The 
case concerned the taxing of mineral royalties by the State of 
Montana on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. The Court had to 
interpret between two different statutes. The Court used the Indian 
law canons of construction to interpret the statutes and ultimately 
held for the Tribe.  
 
A. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States 
 
In 1968, the Court held that the Menominee Tribe retained its 
hunting and fishing rights; despite the fact that its status as a 
federally recognized Indian Tribe had been terminated by Congress 
in 1954.62 The State of Wisconsin argued that the hunting and 
fishing rights of the Menominee had been abrogated by the passage 
of the Termination Act of 1954, which terminated the 
Menominee’s status as a federally recognized Indian Tribe.63 
Justice William Douglas, ruling in favor of the Tribe, used the 
Indian canons of construction and legislative history to find that 
the Tribe retained its hunting and fishing rights despite being 
terminated.64 Though the 1854 treaty between the United States 
and the Tribe did not explicitly state that the Menominee were to 
keep their hunting and fishing rights, the Court interpreted the 
ambiguities in the treaty in favor of the Tribe and held that they 
had retained their hunting and fishing rights by entering into the 
treaty with the United States.65 In examining the legislative history 
in an effort to seek out Congressional intent, the Court looked at 
the Termination Act of 1954, and other Indian related legislation 
passed during the same Congress, and statements by legislators.66 
In examining the Termination Act of 1954, the Court found that 
there was no explicit mention of preserving the hunting and fishing 
rights of the Tribe.67 Though there was not an explicit mention of 
                                                                                                             
61 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). 
62 Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 405-406. 
63 Id. at 408-410. 
64 Id. at 412-413.  
65 Id. at 406 (“The essence of the Treaty of Wolf River was that the Indians were 
authorized to maintain on the new lands ceded to them as a reservation their way 
of life which included hunting and fishing.”). 
66 Id. at 409-411, 413. 
67 Id. at 408. 
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preserving the hunting and fishing rights of the Tribe, the Court did 
not find this ambiguity to be an implied repeal of the Tribe’s 
hunting and fishing rights. Instead, the Court looked at 18 U.S.C. 
§1162, which was passed only two months after the Termination 
Act of 1854. Though, §1162 granted Wisconsin and other states 
jurisdiction over criminal and civil offenses committed on Indian 
reservations, the statute still preserved the treaty rights of 
tribes.68To Justice Douglas, this meant that “although federal 
supervision of the Tribe was to cease and all tribal property was to 
be transferred to new hands, the hunting and fishing rights granted 
or preserved by the Wolf River Treaty of 1854 survived the 
Termination Act of 1954.”69 
To decide that Congress never had the intent to abrogate the 
Wolf River Treaty of 1854, the Court looked at the words of the 
Senate Indian Affairs Committee Chairman, Arthur Watkins of 
Utah, who said upon the passage of the Termination Act of 1954 
that it  “in no way violates any treaty obligation with this 
Tribe.”70By using the Indian law canons of Construction along 
with the legislative history surrounding the Termination Act of 
1954, the Court was able to write an opinion in Menominee that 
upheld the trust responsibility between the United States and the 
Tribe, even though the Tribe had been terminated by Congress.  
Justice Potter Stewart wrote the dissent in Menominee, in 
which he was joined by Justice Hugo Black.71The dissent’s 
argument is a textual argument that relies upon the plain meaning 
of the text in the Termination Act of 1954 and §1162. The dissent 
begins by acknowledging that the language of the Wolf River 
Treaty of 1854 unambiguously conferred special hunting and 
fishing rights to the Menominee within the boundaries of their 
reservation.72The dissent then uses textualism to argue that the 
Menominee have not maintained their hunting and fishing rights 
because those rights have been abrogated by the passage of statutes 
by Congress.73  
                                                                                                             
68 Id. at 408. 
69 Id. at 411. 
70 Id. at 413. 
71 Id. at 413. 
72 Id. at 413-414. 
73 Id. at 414-416. 




The dissent’s textual argument relies upon two points. First that 
the Termination Act of 1954 contains no explicit language that 
pertains to the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee.74 The 
dissent writes “The statute is plain on its face: after termination, 
the Menominee are fully subject to state laws just are other citizens 
are, and no exception is made for hunting and fishing laws.”75The 
dissent is correct, there is no exception made in the Termination 
Act of 1954 for the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee. 
The dissent does not however consider that because the 
Termination Act of 1954 fails to explicitly deal with the hunting 
and fishing rights of the Menominee that an ambiguity then exists. 
The majority solves the problem of this ambiguity by the use of 
stare decisis, relying upon the principle that the abrogation of an 
Indian treaty by Congress must be explicitly, and by looking at the 
legislative history, in particular the statements of the legislator 
responsible for the Termination Act of 1954, Senator 
Watkins.76The second textual argument that the dissent makes is 
that the majority falsely relies upon the principle of in pari 
materia77, because the text of §1162 stated that the continuation of 
special hunting and fishing rights were to be maintained in Indian 
Country and the Termination Act of 1954 abolished the 
Menominee reservation, the dissent saw no need to apply §1162 to 
the Menominee.  
The fatal flaw in the dissent’s argument here is that §1162 was 
passed two months after the passage of the Termination Act of 
1954, both statutes went through the same committees, and same 
Congress, and were signed into law by the same President, and 
§1162 became effective seven years before the Termination Act of 
1854, meaning that when §1162 was enacted the Menominee 
reservation was still Indian Country within the definition of 
§1162.78 Clearly Congress intended for §1162 to apply to the 
Menominee Reservation or it would have said something to 
exclude the Menominee. By looking at the legislative history of the 
two statutes, and considering the two statutes in pari materia, the 
                                                                                                             
74 Id. at 415-416. 
75 Id. at 415. 
76 Id. at 413. 
77 In pari materia, in which statutes that are enacted at different times but 
concern the same subject matter are interpreted in light of each other. 
78 Id. at 410-411. 
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majority succeeds where the dissent fails, and crafts an opinion in 
Menominee that considers Congressional intent, upholds treaty 
rights, and interprets the ambiguities in both statutes in favor of the 
Menominee, thus adhering to the Indian law canons of 
construction.  
 
B. Bryan v. Itasca County 
 
In Bryan v. Itasca County, Justice William Brennan follows the 
framework that this note suggests is the ideal framework for the 
Court to use in Indian law cases that involve questions of statutory 
interpretation. The Court uses legislative history and congressional 
intent, as well as, the Indian law canons of construction to write an 
opinion in Bryan that is in harmony with the trust relationship.79 
In Bryan, the state of Minnesota and Itasca County sought to 
use 18 U.S.C. § 1160 and 18 U.S.C. § 1360 to justify their taxation 
of Bryan.80 The State argued that, in passing PL.280, Congress 
placed the Leech Lake Indian Reservation under the civil 
jurisdiction of the state.81 The State then argued that, since the 
reservation was subject to Minnesota’s civil jurisdiction, Bryan 
was also subject to the taxing powers of the state and local 
government.82 
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan used legislative 
history to show that Congress did not intend to make the Leech 
Lake Indian Reservation and Bryan subject to the taxing powers of 
the state and local governments by passing PL. 280.83 One of the 
ways that the Court did this was by considering, not only the text 
of PL. 280; but also, the intervening legislative enactments of 
                                                                                                             
79 Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381. 
80 18 U.S.C. § 1160 (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006) together compose 
Public Law 280, hereinafter they will collectively be referred to as PL. 280. PL. 
280 was passed by Congress in response to what it saw as lawlessness on some 
Indian reservations. PL. 280 granted the states authority over some civil and 
criminal matters on some Indian reservations. PL. 280 was passed in 1953 when 
Congress was pursuing the goal of further assimilating Indians into the larger 
non-Indian society. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 379-386 (1976) 
for a discussion of the legislative history and congressional intent behind PL. 
280. 
81 Bryan, 426 U.S. at 378-379. 
82 Id. at 375. 
83 Id. at 381. 




Congress since the statute was first passed in 1953.84 For example, 
the Court notes that the passage of 28 U.S.C. §1360(c) by 
Congress “contemplates the continuing vitality of tribal 
government.”85 The position that the State and the County seeks to 
subordinate the Leech Lake Reservation Tribal Council to both the 
state and the local county government.86 This position would strip 
the tribal government of its sovereignty and lessen its viability. 
The Court seeks for the intent of Congress when it cites the 
testimony of Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, who was 
involved in the passage of PL. 280, who said “Public Law 280 
relates primarily to the application of state civil and criminal law in 
court proceedings” to show that Congress did not intend to extend 
to states the taxing authority over tribes when it passed PL. 280; 
but rather sought only to extend criminal and civil authority to 
states over some tribes.87 Lastly, the Court notes that, though there 
is some ambiguity in the statute, the Indian law canons of 
construction call upon the Court to construe these ambiguities in 
favor of the Tribe.88 The Court looks at the legislative history 
behind the statute to discern the intent of Congress;  and, where an 
ambiguity still exists, it then applies the Indian law canons of 
construction. By applying this framework, the Court is able to 
construct an opinion that is mindful of the trust relationship that 
exists between the Tribe and the United States. 
 
C. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians 
 
The Court’s 1985 decision in Blackfeet Tribe89 powerfully 
reaffirmed Indian law canons of construction found in a line of 
cases stretching back for over 150 years. The question in Blackfeet 
was whether the State of Montana could tax the royalty interests of 
the Tribe made from oil and gas produced on the reservation.90 To 
decide whether the State could tax the oil and gas royalties of the 
                                                                                                             
84 Id. at 387-389. 
85 Id. at 376; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2012) (provides for the full force and 
effect of tribal ordinances and customs that do not conflict with any applicable 
civil laws of a state). 
86 Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375. 
87 Id. at 387. 
88 Id. at 392 (citing Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. U.S. 248 U.S. 78 (1918)). 
89 Montana, 471 U.S. at 761. 
90 Id. at 761. 
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Tribe, the Court had to interpret the Indian Mineral and Leasing 
Act of 1938.91 In 1924, Congress amended the 1891 statute that 
permitted mineral leasing on Indian lands.92 The amended 1924 
Act explicitly allowed states like Montana to tax oil, gas, and 
mineral production on tribally held lands, stating that  “the 
production of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be 
taxed by the State in which said lands are located.”93 In 1938, 
Congress passed the Indian Mineral and Leasing Act of 1938 
(IMLA). The IMLA did not explicitly repeal the tax found in the 
1924 statute, nor did it authorize such a tax.94 The Indian Mineral 
and Leasing Act of 1938 did include a general repeal clause, which 
read, “all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent here with are hereby 
repealed.”95 The state of Montana imposed taxes on the mineral 
royalties of the Tribe and its members citing the ability to do so 
under the 1924 statute.96 
Writing for the Court, Justice Byron White held that the State 
of Montana was unable to tax the mineral royalties of the Tribe. 
The Court noted that the standard principles of statutory 
construction do not have the same weight in Indian law that they 
do in other fields of the law, writing “the canons of construction 
applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship 
between the United States and the Indians.”97 In light of the unique 
trust relationship between the Tribe and the United States, the 
canon of statutory construction the Court found did apply was the 
Indian law canons of construction that, “statutes are to be 
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous 
provisions interpreted to their benefit.”98 
By applying the Indian law canons of construction to the 1924 
and 1938 statutes, the Court found that the State’s interpretation of 
the statutes did not meet the rule requiring that the statutes be 
construed liberally in favor of the Tribe.99 The Court specifically 
cites that the trust relationship requires that the Court apply the 
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93 Id. at 763. 
94 Id. at 764. 
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97 Id. at 766. 
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Indian law canons of construction to its interpretation of the 1924 
and 1938 statutes.100 The Court did not stop simply at using the 
Indian law canons of construction to write an opinion that is in 
harmony with the trust relationship and fulfills the moral 
obligation that exists between the United States and the Blackfeet 
Tribe. The Court also looked to the legislative history of the 1938 
Act to find what the intent of Congress was in enacting the statute. 
The Court wrote:  
 
Nothing in either the text, or 
legislative history of the 1938 Act, 
suggests that Congress intended to 
permit States to tax Tribal royalty 
income generated by leases issued 
pursuant to that Act. The statute 
contains no explicit consent to state 
taxation. Nor is there any indication 
that Congress intended to incorporate 
implicitly in the 1938 Act the taxing 
authority of the 1924 act.101  
 
The Court’s consideration of the legislative history of the 1938 act 
is important because, by examining the legislative history of the 
act, the Court is seeking out the intent that Congress had when it 
passed the statute. Congressional intent matters greatly in 
interpreting statutes that regulate Indian affairs because of the 
plenary power that Congress has to regulate Indian affairs. The 
Court, in crafting its opinion, has examined all of the elements that 
the Court should consider in crafting an opinion that is at harmony 
with the trust relationship and the moral obligation that the United 
States owes to a tribe. The Court considers the trust relationship, 
keeping it in the back of its mind as it moves through its statutory 
interpretation, concluding that the trust relationship compels the 
Court to use the Indian law canons of construction to interpret the 
statute then, to ensure that the government to government 
relationship between the Tribe and Congress is respected, the 
Court then examines the legislative history of the statute in 
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question. By using this three-part framework, the Court is able to 
weave an opinion that is in harmony with the trust relationship and 
fulfills the moral obligation that Congress has to the Tribe. 
 
III. TEXTUALISM ALLOWS THE COURT TO IGNORE THE TRUST 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
Since the dawn of the Rehnquist Court in 1986, and proceeding 
into the Roberts Court in 2005, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice 
Clarence Thomas, Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Samuel Alito 
have all used textualism to render decisions in cases involving 
statutory interpretation in Indian law that have largely ignored the 
trust relationship, the intent of Congress in passing the statute, and 
the Indian law canons of construction. These decisions have all had 
a negative impact on Indian tribes on a number of different issues 
ranging from criminal justice, tax, child custody, Indian gaming, 
and land into trust.  
Justice Scalia looked only to the plain meaning of the words in 
the context within, which they are found in a statute.102 Justice 
Scalia was not a proponent of using extrinsic evidence to provide 
definitions for the words in a statute. He held in particular disdain 
the practice of using legislative history to show that a word meant 
a specific definition.103 He stated, “I don’t care what the legislators 
intended. I care what the fair meaning of this word is.”104 Justice 
Scalia did not care to use legislative history to interpret the 
meaning of a statute because he believed that doing so was 
unconstitutional. In discussing the use of committee reports and 
floor speeches to define the meaning of a statute he stated, “[I]t is 
an unconstitutional practice to say that the meaning of statute 
which the full Congress adopted is going to be determined by a 
committee or, indeed by a single individual speaking on the floor 
of Congress.”105 As previously discussed, because Congress has an 
almost supreme authority over Indian affairs, the intent of 
                                                                                                             
102 Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1616 (2012). 
103 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
651 (1990) (“After his elevation to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has 
authored a number of specially concurring or dissenting opinions arguing that 
the Court should ignore legislative history.”). 
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Congress in enacting a statute is extremely important. Using the 
plain meaning of a word in statute can lead to the Court 
interpreting a statute in a case involving a statute that regulates 
Indian affairs in a way that renders a decision at odds with both the 
trust relationship and the original intent that Congress had in 
enacting the statute. 
To a strict textualist like Justice Scalia, a rule of statutory 
construction like the Indian law canons of construction was 
irksome. In his treatise on statutory interpretation, A Matter of 
Interpretation, Justice Scalia directly addressed the Indian law 
canons of construction and other rules of statutory construction. 
Justice Scalia wrote that “these preferential rules and presumptions 
are a lot of trouble.”106 Of the Indian law canons of construction, 
specifically, Justice Scalia said, “Every statute that comes into 
litigation is to some degree ‘ambiguous’; how ambiguous does 
ambiguity have to be before the rule in favor of Indians 
applies?”107 Justice Scalia then asked whether the Court even 
possessed the authority to create such a rule of statutory 
construction. Justice Scalia stated that, “[t]here is also the question 
of where the courts get the authority to impose them. Can we really 
just decree that we will interpret the laws that Congress passes to 
mean less or more than they fairly say? I doubt it.”108 The brand of 
textualism that Justice Scalia espoused that has been adopted by 
the Court makes no exception for the use of legislative history or 
the Indian law canons of construction when engaging in statutory 
interpretation in Indian law. The emergence of the use of 
textualism as the leading tool for statutory interpretation in regard 
to statutes that regulate Indian affairs has effectively rendered the 
Indian law canons of construction obsolete. 
Each Justice has had their own approach to using textualism to 
interpret ambiguities in statutes that regulated Indian affairs. 
However, the approach embraced by the Court’s former foremost 
proponent of textualism, Justice Scalia, is particularly problematic 
for the trust relationship. Justice Scalia’s textualism is emblematic 
of the problem that using textualism in reading a statute that 
regulates Indian affairs poses to the trust relationship because it 
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107 Id. at 28. 
108 Id. at 28-29. 
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ignores legislative history and the Indian law canons of 
construction. The use of textualism by the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts to interpret statutes that regulate Indian affairs is different 
than the approach that was previously embraced by the Court. 
 
IV. THE INDIAN LAW CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION AND THE 
REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS: THE VITIATING OF THE INDIAN 
LAW CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 
 
As we will see from the cases that follow the adoption of the 
use of textualism for statutory interpretation by the Court is in 
many of the Indian law decisions that the Court has decided since 
Chief Justice Burger left the Court in 1986.109 The consistent 
thread throughout Indian law cases that involve statutory 
interpretation is that the Indian interest, more often than not, loses 
when textualism is used to interpret a statute rather than the Indian 
law canons of construction. In these cases, the majority pays little 
to no attention to the trust relationship and shows a total disregard 
for the moral obligation that the United States has to the Tribe. The 
Court has come to treat questions of statutory interpretation in 
Indian law as simple binary problems that elicit a simple “yes” or 
“no” answer that can only be found in the text of the statute. Indian 
law is simply not binary like criminal law, where a person is only 
guilty or not guilty, because of the intricacies and complexities 
brought to Indian law by the unique trust relationship between the 
United States and tribes, Indian law cannot be simply binary. There 
are five hundred and sixty-six federally recognized tribes in the 
United States, and the trust relationship and moral obligation that 
the United States has with each tribe is unique to that Tribe.110 The 
Indian law canons of construction allow for and respect how 
unique the trust relationship is. Each statute is liberally construed 
in favor of the Indian tribe involved in the case. The Indian law 
canons of construction are not beholden to the simple black and 
white text of a statute.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
109 Linda Greenhouse, Warren E. Burger Is Dead at 87; Was Chief Justice for 
17 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at A1.4. 
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A. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village 
 
In 1991, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in Blatchford v. 
Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village.111 The case involved 
a question of statutory interpretation centered around whether the 
enactment of 28 U.S.C. §1362 by Congress was an abrogation of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from the state of Alaska by 
Congress. This allowed the Native villages involved in the case to 
sue the state of Alaska.112  
The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 reads:  
 
The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions, 
brought by any Indian Tribe or band 
with a governing body duly 
recognized by the Secretary of the 
Interior, wherein the matter in 
controversy arises under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.113   
 
In 1980, the State of Alaska passed a statute which, provided 
twenty five thousand dollars  annually to Native  village 
governments located, in the state that were not part of a state 
municipally-chartered community.114 Due to concerns from the 
state’s Attorney General, the state repealed and replaced the statute 
and expanded the program to all communities.115 The expansion of 
the program reduced the funds that the Native  villages would 
receive.116 The Native  villages sued seeking an order requiring the 
state to pay them the full $25,000.00 that they were entitled to 
under the original statute.117 In order to be able to sue the state of 
                                                                                                             
111 Blatchford v. Native  Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775, 
777 (1991). 
112 Id. at 779; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). 
113 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). 
114 Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 778. 
115 Id.  
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 778. 
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Alaska, the Native  villages argued that 28 U.S.C. §1362 allowed 
their suit to move forward.118 
The Court held that §1362 did not expressly contain an 
abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the states against Native 
American tribes.119 The Court wrote that if Congress were to waive 
the sovereign immunity of the states from suit by Native American 
tribes, then such a waiver needed to be made with an 
“unmistakably clear intent to abrogate immunity, made plain in the 
language of the statute.120 The Court did not find in §1362 a plain 
and unambiguous waiver of Alaska’s immunity from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment, and so ruled against the Native  villages.121 
The Court used textualism to rule against the Native villages in 
Blatchford. In contrast to the majority, Justice Blackmun instead 
used the Indian canons of construction in his dissent to argue 
against the conclusion that the Court reached. Specifically, Justice 
Blackmun cited the Indian law canon of construction “that statutes 
passed for the benefit of Indian tribes are to be liberally construed, 
with doubtful expressions resolved in the favor of the Indians.”122 
On its face, §1362 may appear to only be a procedural statute; but 
if it is interpreted using the Indian law canons of construction in a 
way that is in harmony with the trust relationship, then the benefit 
to Indian tribes is obvious. Interpreted in the favor of Indian tribes, 
§1362 allows Indian tribes to sue states, effectively giving them 
the same power that states possess—the power to sue another state. 
Both the state of Alaska and Justice Scalia did not make the 
argument that §1362 was not passed for the benefit of Indian 
tribes. In order to rule against the Native villages on the question 
of whether or not §1362 had abrogated the sovereign immunity of 
the state of Alaska from suit from Indian tribes, Justice Scalia 
completely ignored both the Indian law canons of construction and 
the trust relationship that exists between the United States and the 
Native villages. Instead, had the Court crafted an opinion in 
Blatchford that was in harmony with the trust relationship, and 
used the Indian law canons of construction to interpret §1362. The 
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Court would have furthered tribal sovereignty by placing tribes and 
states on a more equal legal footing. 
 
B. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
Yakima Indian Nation 
 
In 1992, Justice Scalia used the plain text of the General 
Allotment Act123 to rule against the Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation in a dispute over the State of 
Washington’s ability to tax fee lands owned by the Tribe and its 
members on the Tribe’s reservation.124 The Allotment Act was 
signed into law by President Grover Cleveland in 1887.125 The 
supreme aim of the Act was to substitute white civilization for 
tribal culture by making farmers out of individual Indians. To 
achieve this aim, the Act granted one hundred and sixty acres to 
the head of each Indian household and, after twenty five  years, the 
land would be issued to the individual Indian landowners in fee, 
then it could be alienated and encumbered.126 It was hoped that the 
individual Indian land owners would farm their individual 
allotments; and embrace the principles of individual ownership of 
land and capitalism embraced by white civilization, and move 
away from the principle of collective tribal ownership of land long 
adhered to by Indian tribes.127 
Both the Tribe and the United States argued that the Tribe was 
not subject to taxation because §6 of the General Allotment Act 
was defunct; even though, it had not been explicitly repealed by 
Congress.128 The Tribe argued that, since Congress shifted Indian 
policy away from the policy of allotment when it enacted the 
Indian Reorganization Act,129 that this shift was effectively an 
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124 County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian 
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implied repeal of the General Allotment Act and §6.130 The 
legislative history of the Indian Reorganization Act supports the 
Tribe’s position.131 In a memorandum to the Senate and House 
Committees on Indian Affairs, John Collier, the architect of the 
Indian Reorganization Act, wrote of the woes brought onto tribes 
by the Allotment Act and the need for the reform offered by the 
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. Mr. Collier wrote that 
the Act “creates between the Indians and the Government a 
relationship barren, embittered, full of contempt and despair,” and 
that it was apparent that the Allotment Act had created an 
“administrative impossibility.”132 After receiving Mr. Collier’s 
memorandum regarding the negative impact that the Allotment Act 
had on Indian tribes, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization 
Act in 1934 by a resounding margin.133 As further evidence that 
Congress had repealed §6 by implication, the Tribe pointed to the 
fact that in 1948 Congress had defined Indian country to “include 
all fee land within the boundaries of an existing reservation, 
whether or not held by an Indian.”134 
The Court rebutted the Tribe’s argument that the actions of 
Congress in passing the Indian Reorganization Act, and other 
legislative enactments, amounted to an implied repeal of §6. The 
Court examined the text of §6 and found no explicit language that 
exempted the lands in question from state and local taxation. The 
Court then stated that it was a “cardinal rule that repeals by 
implication are not favored,” and proceeded to rule against the 
Tribe. The plain language of §6 states that once an allottee is 
granted a patent in fee simple that “thereafter all restrictions as to 
sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed.”135 
Justice Scalia argued that in Congress’ 1934 enactment of 25 
U.S.C. § 461, Congress chose to not return allotted land to its pre-
Allotment Act status. He found this to be further proof that §6 was 
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not repealed by implication.136 The decision that the Court 
rendered in Yakima ignored the Indian law canons of construction, 
the intent of Congress behind changes in Indian policy after the 
passage of the Allotment Act, and the trust relationship. 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Yakima crafts a result that is in 
harmony with the trust relationship and pays respect to the plenary 
power of Congress over Indian affairs by using the Indian law 
canons of construction and congressional intent. Justice Blackmun 
wrote: 
 
[T]he Court mistakenly assumes that 
it cannot give any effect to the many 
complex intervening statutes 
reflecting a complete turnabout in 
federal Indian policy—now aimed at 
preserving Tribal integrity and the 
Indian land base—since enactment at 
the turn of the century of the 
statutory provisions upon which the 
Court relies. These current and now 
longstanding federal policies weigh 
decisively against the Court’s finding 
that Congress has intended the States 




Justice Blackmun went to the heart of the matter—the General 
Allotment Act was enacted more than 100 years before the Court 
heard Yakima and, since then, Congress and the goals that it had in 
passing statutes that regulate Indian affairs had changed. At the 
turn of the nineteenth century when the General Allotment Act was 
enacted, Congress had the goal of assimilating Indians into the 
dominant white society in order to make yeoman farmers out of as 
many Indians as possible.138 These policies were a sharp contrast 
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to the policies of the Indian Reorganization Act, which sought to 
strengthen tribal governments and encourage the development of 
tribal sovereignty.139 Justice Blackmun’s dissent acknowledges this 
total shift in Indian policy, as well as, the failure of the Allotment 
Act.140 To Justice Blackmun, the intent that Congress had in 
passing the Indian Reorganization Act was, at least in part, to end 
the harm done to Indian tribes by the Allotment Act.141 Given that 
Congress has a plenary power when it comes to enacting statutes 
that regulate Indian affairs, the congressional intent behind the 
passage of the statute, or subsequent statutes that alter the policy 
created by a preceding statute, should be given great weight by the 
Court. Justice Blackmun gives great weight to Congressional intent 
in his dissent, while Justice Scalia does not and, in doing so, 
Justice Scalia gives short shrift to the trust relationship between 
Congress and Indian tribes. 
 
C. South Dakota v. Bourland 
 
South Dakota v. Bourland was a 1993 case dealing with treaty 
and statutory interpretation centered on the Cheyenne River Act.142 
Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion of the Court. The 
question before the Court was whether the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe had the power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians 
on its former reservation lands that had been acquired by the 
United States for the operation of the Oahe dam and reservoir.143 
The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 set aside the Great Sioux 
Reservation for several Sioux tribes, including the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe.144 The Fort Laramie Treaty provided for the “absolute 
and undisturbed use and occupation of Sioux Tribes and that no 
non-Indians (except authorized government agents) would ever be 
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the Great Sioux 
Reservation.”145 The Great Sioux Reservation was then divided 
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into several reservations by the Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 
U.S.C. §888, which demarcated the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation, located in South Dakota.146 The 1889 statute 
contained language that explicitly preserved those rights of the 
Tribe held under the Fort Laramie Treaty as long as those rights 
did not conflict with the language of the newly passed statute.147 
In the time period following the construction of the Lake Oahe 
dam, the Tribe and the State of South Dakota both regulated 
hunting and fishing in the fee land surrounding the dam and 
reservoir.148 In 1988, the Tribe announced that it would not 
recognize hunting licenses issued by South Dakota, and that those 
found within the boundaries of the reservation with only a state 
hunting license would be subject to prosecution in Tribal court.149 
The State filed suit seeking to enjoin the Tribe from taking action 
against those hunting on non-trust lands within the boundary of the 
reservation.150 The case turned on the interpretation of §10 of the 
Cheyenne River Act. 
The Court ruled that Congress had abrogated the Tribe’s rights 
to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians in the fee lands of 
the reservation that had been taken for the construction of the Lake 
Oahe dam.151The Court relied upon the plain text of the Cheyenne 
River Act as well as precedent from earlier decisions of the Court 
to reach the conclusion that Congress had abrogated the Tribe’s 
right to exclude non-Indians. Although the Court acknowledges 
that statutes should be construed liberally in the favor of Indians, it 
found that the language of both the Flood Control Act and the 
Cheyenne River Acts eliminated the Tribe’s power to exclude non-
Indians from the fee lands within the boundaries of the 
reservation.152 §4 of the Flood Control Act provides that projects 
such as the Oahe reservoir should be open to public use for 
recreational purposes.153 Though no language in the Flood Control 
Act specifically acknowledged the Tribe or the Treaty of Fort 
Laramie, the Court chose to give more force to the language in the 
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statute promising recreational use of the reservoir and the lands 
adjacent to it than to the trust relationship and moral obligation to 
the Tribe that was created by Congress ratifying the Treaty of Fort 
Laramie.154 The Court went on to point out that if Congress 
intended for the Tribe to be able to regulate hunting and fishing on 
the fee lands within the boundary of the reservation, it would have 
done so when it passed the Cheyenne River Act.155 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent found the majority’s opinion and its 
reliance on the text of the Flood Control Act and the Cheyenne 
River Act to be misplaced.156 Justice Blackmun noted that the 
majority found no explicit language granting the Tribe the 
authority to regulate hunting and fishing on the fee lands, and also 
found no language banning the Tribe from doing so. Rather, 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent points out what the majority has done 
in looking at the text of both statutes—using the text of the two 
statutes to find an implied repeal of the Tribe’s right to regulate 
hunting and fishing on the fee lands. Justice Blackmun’s dissent 
advocated for the use of the Indian law canons of construction to 
affirm the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
had held for the Tribe. 
The majority’s reliance on the ambiguities in the text of both 
the Cheyenne River Act and the Flood Control Act ignores both 
the Indian law canons of construction and the trust relationship. 
Ambiguities in statutes like the Cheyenne River Act and the Flood 
Control Act, that Congress passes that regulate Indian affairs are 
supposed to be construed liberally in the favor of Indian tribes. 
Interpreting both of these statutes in such a manner would have 
upheld the Tribe’s authority to regulate hunting on the fee lands of 
the reservation. This would have enabled the Tribe to better ensure 
a food supply for its membership. The hunting rights of the Tribe 
were critically important to the Tribe and were promised to the 
Tribe in perpetuity in the Treaty of Fort Laramie. Thus, the 
majority’s judicial dilution of the Tribe’s ability to regulate 
hunting and fishing on their treaty lands ignores the moral 
obligation and trust relationship that was created between the Tribe 
and Congress by the Treaty of Fort Laramie. Had the Court used 
the approach of using the Indian law canons of construction to 
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construe the ambiguities in the Flood Control Act and the 
Cheyenne River Act in favor of the Tribe, he would have been able 
to craft an opinion that would have been in harmony with the trust 
relationship. 
 
D. Chickasaw Nation v. United States 
 
In 2001 in Chickasaw Nation v. United States, the Court used 
textualism in its statutory interpretation of the Indian Gaming and 
Regulatory Act (IGRA) to find that Tribes are required to pay 
federal taxes on pull tabs157 used in gaming.158 The Chickasaw 
Nation sued the United States seeking a refund of the federal 
wagering and occupational excise taxes that it had paid in 
conjunction with the Nation’s pull tab gaming operations.159 
Writing for the majority, Justice Steven Breyer stated that specific 
canons of statutory interpretation like Indian law canons of 
construction can be countered by “some maxim pointing in a 
different direction.”160 Breyer went on to give more force to the 
maxim that “warns us against interpreting federal statutes as 
providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly 
expressed.”161 The tax exemption that the Tribe sought to reclaim 
the taxes that it had paid on its pull tab gaming operations, was not 
expressly found in IGRA. Since the tax exemption that the Tribe 
hoped for was not explicitly found in the plain text of the statute, 
the Court did not find for the Tribe. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented in Chickasaw. Justice 
O’Connor believed that, on its face, IGRA was ambiguous as to 
whether or not tribes had to pay taxes on pull tabs and so she 
wrote, “Because I believe §2719(d) is subject to more than one 
interpretation, and because statutes are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their 
benefit, I respectfully dissent.”162 Justice O’Connor concludes in 
her dissent that an ambiguity does exist in §2719(d) that cannot be 
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solved by looking at either the legislative history or the text of the 
statute.163 Here then, Justice O’Connor argued that the Indian law 
canons of construction should be consulted by the Court.164 
Further, Justice O’Connor’s approach to interpreting §2719(d) 
is in harmony with the trust relationship. Justice O’Connor 
acknowledged the Indian law canons of construction and applied 
them to her interpretation of the statute. Justice O’Connor 
acknowledged that there are two competing canons at play in this 
case—the Indian law canons of construction and the canon that 
Justice Breyer uses that states that tax exemptions must be 
expressly given by Congress before the Court can grant them.165 
Justice O’Connor points out that the Court should give more 
weight to the Indian law canons of construction because the Court 
has held previously, in Choate v. Trapp, that when two canons 
conflict, the Indian law canon “predominates”.166 Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent uses the Indian law canons of construction as 
well as stare decisis in regards to Choate to reach a decision that is 
in harmony with the trust relationship and acknowledges the moral 
obligation that the United States owes to the Chickasaw Tribe. 
 
E. Carcieri v. Salazar 
 
In 2009, in Carcieri v. Salazar, the Court used textualism to 
interpret the Indian Reorganization Act instead of applying the 
Indian law canons of construction.167 The issue in Carcieri was the 
ability of the Department of the Interior (DOI) to take a parcel of 
land into trust for the Narragansett Tribe.168 The federal 
government formally recognized the Narragansett Tribe in 1983.169 
After being recognized, the Tribe purchased thirty-one acres for 
housing and requested that the DOI take the land into trust for the 
Tribe.170 The DOI accepted the land into trust. The State of Rhode 
Island and the local municipality sued to enjoin the Department’s 
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action.171 The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the DOI’s 
action in Carcieri v. Kempthorne. 
The Court of Appeals found that the use of the word “now” in 
the statute was ambiguous.172 As evidence for this ambiguity, the 
Court of Appeals cited two reasons—one, that Congress had used 
the word “now” in other statutes to refer to the time of the statute’s 
application and not its enactment; and, two, that the text of §479 
did not clarify the meaning of “now” within the context of the 
statute.173 The Court then applied the rule from Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and deferred to the 
DOI’s understanding of the word “now” and ruled for the DOI and 
the Tribe.”174 The State of Rhode Island then petitioned the 
Supreme Court for certiorari.175 
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion in Carcieri v. 
Salazar. The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The Court wrote that the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” in 
the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §479176 unambiguously 
referred only to those tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 
Since the Narragansett Tribe was not, then the DOI could not 
legally take land into trust for the Tribe.177  
The Court purported to look at the plain meaning of the words 
of §479. The Court interpreted “now” as meaning at the time of the 
statute’s enactment.178 Instead of interpreting “now” as the as such, 
the Court should have used the Indian law canons of construction 
that statutes are to be liberally construed in the favor of Indians. 
The Court could have read “now” as referring to 1998, when the 
DOI accepted the land into trust instead of 1934, when the statute 
was enacted. Instead of doing so, the Court applied the plain 
meaning rule against the DOI and the Tribe. 
In writing its opinion, the Court included text from a letter 
from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier. 
 
                                                                                                             
171 Id. at 383. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 384. 
174 Id. 384. 
175 Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d. 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
176 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012). 
177 Carcieri, 497 F.3d. at 22. 
178 Id. at 26-27. 
2017] Justice Scalia and Tonto      730 
 
 
Section 19 of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934 
(48 Stat. L., 988) provides, in effect, 
that the term ‘Indian’ as used therein 
shall include—(1) all persons of 
Indian descent who are members of 
any recognized Tribe that was under 
Federal jurisdiction at the date of the 
Act. 
 
There are problems with including the text of the letter from 
Collier as justification to define “now” as meaning those tribes that 
were recognized by the federal government at the time of the 
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act. As Justice Stevens 
points out in his dissent, there were tribes that were under federal 
jurisdiction at the time of the statutes enactment though the DOI 
did not know it at the time and thus, they were not formally 
recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.179 Three examples of 
tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, but who weren’t 
officially recognized by the federal government that Justice 
Stevens cites are the Shoshone Indians of Nevada, the Mole Lake 
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, and the St. Croix Chippewa 
Indians of Wisconsin.180 Justice Stevens also falls back on the 
Indian law canons of construction to point out the error in Justice 
Thomas’ construction of the word “now,” which “the Court 
ignores the principle deeply rooted in [our] Indian jurisprudence 
that statutes are to be construed liberally in the favor of the 
Indians.”181 
Carcieri has reverberated across Indian Country. Numerous 
tribes have faced challenges in putting their lands into trust. The 
Tribe’s opponents have typically cited Justice Thomas’ plain 
meaning interpretation of §479 to successfully defeat the Tribe’s 
efforts. For example, in Littlefield v. United States Department of 
the Interior, the Court read §479 the same way as the Court did 
and ruled against the DOI and the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe.182 
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The Court’s opinion in Carcieri, and its use of an ordinary 
dictionary to define the words in a statute while engaging in 
statutory interpretation, ignores the trust relationship and the moral 
obligation that the United States has to the Tribe. It tilts a portion 
of the Indian Reorganization Act against any tribe formally 
recognized by the United States after 1934. As discussed in the 
portion of the note that dealt with Yakima, the Indian 
Reorganization Act was passed to help tribes, not to stymie them. 
The Court’s construction ignores the Congressional intent in the 
passage of the Act in its narrow interpretation of the word “now.” 
As Justice Brennan noted in Bryan, the trust relationship requires 
that the Court use the Indian law canons of construction when 
dealing with ambiguities in statutes that regulate Indian affairs. 
The Court does not do that here and it does not consider the overall 
Congressional intent of the Indian Reorganization Act either. By 
ignoring Congressional intent and the Indian law canons of 
construction, the Court crafts an opinion that is not in harmony 
with the trust relationship between the United States and the Tribe 
and any moral obligation that the United States has to the Tribe. 
The land in question was to be placed in trust for the Tribe so that 
it could build housing for its elderly members. The Court’s opinion 
turns a blind eye to the fact that the United States may have an 
obligation to the Tribe to see its lands returned to it when possible, 
and to see that the Tribe is able to provide housing to its members 




The adoption by the Court of textualism to interpret a statute 
that regulates Indian affairs has rendered the Indian law canons of 
construction obsolete. It does not matter if the case involves a 
question of statutory or treaty interpretation, the Indian law canons 
of construction have no longer been applied. The lasting impact of 
this is that the trust relationship between Congress and tribes has 
been altered by the Court. The paradigm has changed. Statutory 
interpretation in Indian law has become a binary equation, when in 
reality it should be a jigsaw puzzle with many pieces that need to 
be correctly fitted together to form the entire completed puzzle. 
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The completed puzzle is one that is in harmony with the trust 
relationship between tribes and the United States, and that 
acknowledges and seeks to fulfill the unique moral obligations that 
the United States has to each of the 566 federally recognized tribes 
within its borders. The previous cases show that the Court no 
longer considers how the trust relationship impacts its 
interpretation of a statute, nor does it consider legislative intent or 
the Indian law canons of construction. Thus, Congress must be 
very careful whenever it drafts legislation that regulates Indian 
affairs. This language will not be examined from the context from 
which it was in, nor will the intent that Congress had in passing it 
be given weight. All that will matter for the foreseeable future will 
be the plain black and white text of the statute that rolls out of the 
Government Printing Office. Perhaps with the February 2016 
passing of Justice Scalia, this will change and the Court will move 
back to using legislative history and the Indian law canons of 
construction in interpreting statutes that regulate Indian affairs, 
leaving Justice Scalia to fistfight in heaven with Tonto over the 
meaning of a word in a statute passed a long time ago. 
